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Summary
All tax indicator estimates, whether based on aggregate- or micro data, need to be 
corroborated by other information and preferably also other tax indicators before policy 
conclusions can reasonably be drawn. The purpose of this paper is to describe the way 
the (macroeconomic) implicit tax rate on labour income is calculated in the European 
Commission “Structures of the Taxation Systems in the EU” publication, to show its 
relationship to the widely recognised (microeconomic) tax wedge indicator for an 
average production worker from the “Taxing Wages” approach of the OECD, and to 
illustrate its use. It appears from the European Commission report that evidence from the 
implicit tax ratio at the macro level in a single year cannot simply be projected to 
observations for an average worker at the micro level, and conversely. With a few 
exemptions, however, both the macroeconomic and the microeconomic indicator appear 
to have comparable informative content as regards to general increasing or decreasing 
trends over time. It should be noted that the changes in the macroeconomic implicit tax 
rate may reflect structural changes in the entire economy, such as changes in the 
distribution of wage income. The implicit tax rate relates to actual tax revenue data and it 
could be, for example, that the revenue effect of targeted reductions in personal income 
tax, at say, the lower end of the income scale, has been offset by increases in wage 
income at the top of the wage scale. The two indicators could then be considered 
complementary instruments for evaluating tax policy. 
Keywords: Tax indicators, Effective tax rates, Taxes on labour, Non-wage labour costs. 
JEL Classification: E62, H22, J32 5
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1. INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomic implicit tax rates are backward-looking tax ratios derived using 
aggregate data on tax revenues (numerator) and the aggregate income in the economy 
(denominator). Several authors give “health warnings” to the use of implicit tax rates. 
The authors of OECD (2001), for example, conclude that “…average tax rates measured 
using aggregate data will in a number of cases generate misleading indicators of the tax 
burden on taxpayers, on factors of production and on consumption. The major limitation 
of existing methodologies for calculating tax ratios is the techniques applied to allocate 
tax revenues to selected aggregate tax base are underdeveloped. At the same time it was 
recognised that an examination of such ratios is a useful exercise, if only to identify the 
substantial shortcomings of these measures. The message of this (OECD) study is that 
policymakers should be aware of the measurement problems underlying average tax rate 
based on aggregate data, should they be fielded to shape public policy debate.”
The purpose of this paper is to describe the way the (improved) average effective 
(implicit) tax ratio on labour income is calculated in the European Commission 
“Structures of the Taxation Systems in the EU” publication, to show its relationship to 
the widely recognised “Taxing Wages” approach by the OECD, and to illustrate its use. 
The paper basically summarises the checks and balances that were carried out by the 
European Commission services. It shows, in particular, that the correlation of the implicit 
tax rate on labour with the micro indicator from the “Taxing Wages” approach by the 
OECD is reasonably strong. It also confirms the view that the evidence from 
observations of the implicit tax rate needs to be corroborated by a other information and 
also other tax indicators before policy conclusions can reasonably be drawn.
2. METHODOLOGY
The implicit tax rate on employed labour is defined as all direct and indirect taxes and 
employees' and employers' social contributions levied on employed labour income 
divided by the total compensation of employees working in the economic territory. 
Here, direct taxes are defined as the revenue from personal income tax that can be 
allocated to labour income. Indirect taxes on labour income, currently applied in some 
Member States, are taxes such as payroll taxes paid by the employer. The compensation 
of employees is defined as total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer 
to an employee in return for work done. It consists of gross wages (in cash or in kind) 
and thus also the amount paid as social insurance contributions and wage withholding 
tax. In addition, employers' contributions to social security (including imputed social 
contributions) as well as to private pensions and related schemes are included. 
Compensation of employees is thus a broad measure of the gross economic income from 
employment before any charges are withheld. 7
Box 1  Definition of the implicit tax rate on labour 
Ratio Definition
Implicit tax rate on employed labour 
(ESA95)
Direct taxes, indirect taxes and 
compulsory actual social contributions 
paid by employers and employees, on 
employed labour income/ (D1 + D29C) 
Numerator: Taxes on employed labour
From D51        Taxes on income: 
D51A+D51C1 Taxes on individual or household income including holding gains 
                                                                       (part raised on labour income) 
D29C     Total wage bill and payroll taxes 
From D611   Actual social contributions: 
D61111     Compulsory employers' actual social contributions 
D61121     Compulsory employees' social contributions 
Denominator:
D1   Compensation of employees 
D29C  Wage bill and payroll taxes 
The fundamental methodological problem in calculating the implicit tax rate on labour 
and capital is that the personal income tax is typically broad-based and relates to multiple 
sources of income (i.e. employed labour, self-employed labour, income from capital and 
income in the form of social benefits and pensions received).
Compared to previous editions of the “Structures of the Taxation Systems”, for the 2003 
edition the methodology for allocating the personal income tax revenue across different 
income sources has significantly been improved, by the use of micro tax revenue data 
and detailed wage- and income tax statistics from national tax departments. This means 
that the estimates incorporate the fact that effective tax rates may vary across different 
taxable income sources and groups of taxpayers. Ten out of the fifteen Member States 
actually used data sets of individual taxpayers to carry out the estimates; three Member 
States used income class data based on a data set of individual taxpayers and two others 
used tax receipts data from withholding tax- and income tax statistics, and applied certain 
corrections. 
The resulting implicit tax rate on labour should be seen as a summary measure that 
approximates an average effective tax burden on labour income in the economy. It must 
be recognised that the tax ratio may hide important variation in effective tax rates across 
different household types or at different wage levels. In some countries, for example, the 
recent tax reforms may have clearly more pronounced effects on low-paid, low-qualified 
workers or families with children. 8
3. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS: STABILISING/DECLINING TAX BURDEN ON LABOUR IN 
RECENT YEARS
The empirical results are limited to the EU-15 Member States since at the moment there 
has not been enough time to compute the split of the Personal Income Tax by economic 
functions for the new Member States, which is a prerequisite to compute the ITR on 
labour.
Previous publications by Commission services on the 'Structures of taxation systems in 
the European Union'
1, based on ESA79 system of national accounts, reported a common 
increasing trend in the tax burden on labour income in the EU-15 area since the 
beginning of the early 1970s (despite some decreases in single years). This general 
increase, which was quite marked in the 1970s and was still significant in the 1980s and 
the first half of the 1990s, was closely related to the increasing share of the public sector 
in the economy, in particular of social welfare spending driven by dependency ratios 
(especially for pensions, health care and other social benefits). The increase in the first 
half of the 1990s was associated with increases in social contributions related to the 
recession at the beginning of the decade. Moreover, increases in the tax burden were 
related to restrict budget deficits in the running up for the EMU. 
Since the late 1990s, a number of EU-15 Member States implemented fiscal measures to 
lower the tax burden on labour income, in order to boost the demand for labour, and to 
foster work incentives
2. Concerns about excessive labour costs prompted initiatives in 
some Member States to reduce non-wage labour costs (i.e. social contributions and other 
payroll taxes) across-the-board. Other Member States put forward targeted reductions of 
social contributions on behalf of low-paid and low-qualified workers. These cuts in 
social contributions have mostly been focused on relieving the fiscal pressure for 
employers, although some countries have also made substantial cuts to employee social 
contributions. Reforms of personal income tax codes often consist of lowering statutory 
tax rates, as well as raising the minimum level of tax exempted income and/or 
introducing specific tax base deductions and allowances or tax liability credits for 
workers with relatively low levels of earnings. 
It now appears that the general trend towards increasing the implicit tax rate on labour 
has mostly stabilised or reversed slightly since the mid-1990s for most Member States 
(Table 1)
3. Previous ESA79 data displayed a steady increase in the EU average implicit 
tax rate on labour (weighted by the total compensation of employees in the economy) 
from less than 30% in 1970 to almost 42% in 1997. New ESA95 data for the period 1995 
to 2002, though not fully comparable, now indicate that the EU average implicit tax rate 
first continued to increase from 37.3% in 1995 to 37.7% in 1996, then stabilized until 
1998 and finally started to slightly decrease reaching 36.3% in 2002
4. However, the 
1 European Commission (2000 a, b). 
2 See also Carone and Salomäki (2001). 
3 A markedly slower annual rate of increase in the average effective tax rate on labour is reported for the 1990-
2000 period in Carey and Rabesona (2002). 
4 Implicit tax rates computed on the basis of ESA79 data are generally higher than those on the basis of ESA95 
data over the same period. This can partly be attributed to improved methods for estimating the allocation 
of personal income tax across different income sources.  9
pattern of the changes is quite diverse across Member States. Notable reductions in the 
period 1995-2002 are visible in Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxemburg and the 
United Kingdom, while in the period 1998-2002 the hugest reductions can be found in 
Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy and France. In the other Member States the 
implicit tax rate more or less stabilised. In Spain, Portugal and Greece the implicit tax 
rate continued to increase. The generally more pronounced decrease in 2002 respect to 
previous years is probably linked also to the slowdown of the economy 
Table 1 Implicit tax rates on labour in the Union 
1995-2002, in % 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Diff. 95-02 Diff. 98-02
BE 44,1 43,7 44,3 44,6 43,8 44,2 43,9 43,5 -0,7 -1,1
DK 40,7 41,2 41,5 39,9 41,1 41,8 41,5 39,9 -0,8 0,0
DE 39,5 39,7 40,6 40,7 40,4 40,2 39,9 39,9 0,4 -0,8
EL 34,1 35,7 36,4 37,5 37,0 38,2 37,6 37,8 3,7 0,4
ES 28,9 29,5 29,0 28,7 28,1 28,6 29,6 30,0 1,1 1,2
FR 42,2 42,6 42,7 43,2 43,5 43,1 42,7 41,8 -0,3 -1,4
IE 29,8 29,7 29,9 28,9 28,6 28,3 27,5 25,9 -3,9 -2,9
IT 37,8 41,4 43,1 42,8 42,1 41,3 41,5 41,1 3,3 -1,8
LU 29,5 29,3 29,1 28,4 28,9 30,0 29,2 28,0 -1,5 -0,4
NL 35,1 34,1 33,4 33,9 34,8 35,4 31,8 31,9 -3,1 -2,0
AT 38,7 39,3 40,2 39,9 40,1 39,7 40,0 39,2 0,5 -0,7
PT 31,0 31,6 32,5 32,9 33,0 33,2 33,3 33,7 2,7 0,9
FI 43,9 44,8 43,3 43,8 43,4 44,0 44,4 43,9 0,0 0,1
SE 48,4 49,7 50,0 51,0 50,5 49,3 47,9 46,6 -1,7 -4,4
UK 25,7 24,7 24,2 25,1 25,3 25,7 25,4 24,6 -1,1 -0,5
EU-15 37,3 37,7 37,7 37,7 37,5 37,2 36,8 36,3 -0,9 -1,4
Source: Commission Services
By the year 2002, labour income is estimated to be most heavily taxed in Sweden, 
despite having the greatest reduction between 1998 and 2002. Also Finland and Belgium 
have an implicit tax rates well above 40% of the wage bill. Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, stand out with implicit tax rates well below 30% (Graph 1). 
For the majority of the countries in the Union, the implicit tax rate on labour largely 
reflects the important role played by wage-based contributions in financing the social 
security system
5. On average, somewhat more than 60% of the overall implicit tax rate 
on labour consists of non-wage labour costs paid by both employees and employers
6.
5 It should be noted that the categories 'personal income tax' and 'social contributions' in the graph sometimes 
consist of multiple tax categories. In the 'Nordic' countries, for example, the recorded amount of personal 
income tax does not only consist of central government income tax, but also state income tax, or 
municipality income tax and sometimes also church tax. In France, the generalised social contribution 
('CSG') and the contribution for the reduction of the debt of the social security institutions ('CRDS') are 
partially booked as income tax on labour income. In Austria, the tax on industry and trade and the 
contribution to chambers are also partially booked as income tax on labour income. In Italy, a new tax 
called 'IRAP' based on value of production net of depreciations was introduced in 1998 at the same time 
when employers' social contributions were substantially reduced. A part of its revenue has been allocated 
to labour and employers' social contributions in particular (and also included in the denominator of the tax 
ratio). 
6 It is worth noting that the effective tax rate on labour in the US was estimated just 24% in 1999, with non-
wage labour cost only 12% of the average gross wage. See European Commission (2000a). 10
Only in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom do personal income taxes form a 
relatively large part of the total charges paid on labour income. In Denmark, the share of 
social contributions in government receipts is relatively low as most welfare spending is 
financed out of general taxation
7. The relatively low tax burden on labour in Ireland and 
the United Kingdom can largely be explained by the relatively low shares of the social 
contributions in these countries. The overall average rate of personal income taxation (as 
percentage of total labour costs) seems for example not very different from high tax 
countries like Sweden, Finland and Belgium. The latter countries have relatively high 
rates of both personal income tax and social contributions (as percentage of total labour 
costs).
Graph 1 Decomposition of the implicit tax rate on labour 
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Source: Commission Services 
The average implicit tax rate on labour (EU-15) still remains relatively high by 
international standards
8. It should however be noted that the full effects of the recent 
fiscal reforms could be reflected in the data with a certain delay. Also, a number of 
Member States are implementing further fiscal measures to improve labour market 
performance, which will come into effect beyond the year 2002. Next graph shows in 
each Member State the developments of the single components of the ITR in the whole 
period observed. It could be observed that the reduction in the EU-15 is linked especially 
7 Large part of employees' social contribution in Denmark comes from a 8% contribution paid on the basis of 
employees gross earnings. This revenue in some publications is classified as a social security contribution 
and in others it is reported as a separate type of personal income tax. 
8 Carey and Rabesona (2002) estimated the EU average effective tax rate on labour reached some 37% in 1999, 
compared with 25% and 23% for the United States and Japan, respectively. Martinez-Mongay (2000) 
provides broadly similar differences between the EU and the United States and Japan. 11
to the reduction of employees' social contributions, while the PIT shows overall a slight 
increase. 
Graph 2 Developments of the single components of the ITR on labour 
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4. A NOTE ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE IMPLICIT TAX RATE ON LABOUR
The implicit tax rate on labour is a macro backward-looking indicator that is mainly 
derived from aggregate data in national accounts. As such, the tax ratio should be seen as 
a summary measure that approximates an average effective tax burden on labour income 
in the economy. It must be recognised that the tax ratio may hide important variation in 
effective tax rates across different household types or at different wage levels
9. The 
decomposition of total tax wedges, for example, may be quite different at relatively low 
or relatively high wage levels. Also, in some Member States the recent fiscal reforms 
may have had more pronounced effects on low-paid, low-qualified workers or on 
families with children. When interpreting the time-series comparisons, it should be borne 
in mind that the evolution refers to an ex-post trend without disentangling cyclical, 
structural and policy elements. This means that the observed changes may only partially 
reflect discretionary tax policy measures. In some Member States, for example, strong 
economic growth may have moved taxpayers into higher personal income tax brackets 
resulting in higher real tax payments ('bracket creep'), or taxpayers at the top of the pay 
scale may have witnessed relatively high increases in incomes, and such changes may 
have induced a cyclical swing in the implicit tax rate on labour that may to some extent 
offset the (ex-ante) expected fall driven by the tax reforms (aimed at reducing the tax 
burden at the bottom to the middle end of the distribution, say). 
9 See also Clark (2002). 12
In addition, it should again be noted that the figures in the national accounts often do not 
follow a real accrual principle. According to the ESA95 rules for the national accounts, 
taxes should normally be recorded when the underlying economic event/transaction takes 
place rather than then when the actual tax payment is made. Personal income tax, for 
example, is typically levied on incomes accrued one year prior to actual collection. 
However, ESA95 allows for considerable flexibility in interpreting accrual time of 
recording, depending on the type of taxes. Most statistical offices in fact use 'time 
adjusted' cash figures for a few months, which is permitted following amendments of 
ESA95. This means that the effects of tax reforms may be reflected in the figures with 
some delay, even when time shifted cash-figures are used. 
Box 2 in the next page presents an overview of the main fiscal measures that seem to be 
(partially) reflected in the pattern of the changes in the implicit tax rates on labour   
(Graph 8 at page 25 displays the time trend of the implicit tax rates for each EU-15 
Member State).  13
Box 2  Overview of main fiscal measures affecting the ITR on labour 
Personal income tax  Social contributions 
BE • Indexing of tax brackets abandoned 
Introduction of 'crisis tax' on top of all 
statutory rates plus 'solidarity levy' on 
personal income (1997). Reintroduction 
of automatic indexing of tax brackets 
(1999). Phasing out of additional 'crisis 
tax' (1997-2004). 
• Personal income tax reform of which the 
main provisions are (a) the lowering the tax 
burden on earned income including the 
introduction and subsequent increase of 
refundable employment tax credit aimed at 
low paid workers (b) a neutral tax treatment 
of spouses and singles (c) more favourable 
treatment of dependent children (d) 
greening of the tax system (2000-2006). 
• Lowering of employers' contributions, 
especially in respect of the low-paid. The 
scope of the reductions in employers' 
social contributions was expanded to 
more social security schemes (1997-2001). 
• Flat rate reductions in employers' 
contributions for young workers, low 
skilled workers and workers aged over 45. 
DK • Reductions in rate low tax bracket (1996-
1999). Increase in rate additional medium 
tax bracket (1997). Reductions of 
personal income tax, especially at the 
bottom- to the middle end (1999-2002). 
• Increase employees' social contribution 
rate (1997). Split of the social 
unemployment contribution into two 
contributions: one for unemployment 
insurance and the other is a voluntary 
contribution for an early retirement 
scheme. The combined social 
contribution rate is higher. Introduction 
of contribution employees for special 
pension savings scheme (1999). 
DE • Across-the-board reductions of personal 
income tax (1999-2002). 
• Gradual increase of basic tax-free 
allowance (1998-2004) 
• Increase in social contribution rates 
(1997).
• Reduction of social contributions to the 
pension system (1999-2002). 
EL • Reduction of highest statutory personal 
income tax rate, indexing of tax brackets 
plus increase in standard tax allowances 
(2000-2002).
• Increase in income tax allowances (2000-
2002
• Reductions of employers' and employees' 
pension contributions in respect of new 
staff and at the low end of the wage scale 
(2001-2002).
ES • Across the board reduction of personal 
income tax rates (1999). 
• Increase in work income allowance for 
low wages (1999). 
• Increase in basic personal allowances 
(1999).
• Targeted reductions in social 
contributions (1997-2000). 
• Reduction in unemployment 
contributions for employers and 
employees (2001). 14
Box 2  Continued 
FR
1 • Introduction of contribution for 
refunding of debt of social security 
institutions ('CRDS') with a broader base 
than the generalised social contribution 
('CSG') (1996). 
• Gradual reduction of CSG and CRDS 
(2001-2003).
• Reductions of personal income tax, 
especially at the bottom to the middle 
end (2001). 
• Gradual reduction in tax rates and 
modification of tax-free allowance system 
targeted especially to low-income earners 
(2001-2002).
• Reduction of employers' contributions in 
respect of low-paid workers in association 
with reduction working week (1997-
2001).
• Reduction of employees' sickness 
contributions (1998). Reduction of 
employees' and employers' 
unemployment contributions (2000-
2001).
IE • Personal income tax rates reductions, 
especially at the bottom- to the middle 
end (1997-2001). 
• Increases in basic tax allowances/credits 
(1997-2001).
• Widening of the rate band (2000). 
• Reductions in employers' and employees' 
PRSI levies (1997-2002). 
• Reduction in employers' contribution in 
respect of the low-paid (2001). 
IT
2 • Personal income tax rate of the second 
bracket down (2000). 
• Further reductions in tax rates of all the 
brackets, in particular the middle brackets 
(2001-2002).
• Family allowance supplemented by and 
additional tax credit depending on the 
number of dependent children (2002). 
• Reduction of employers' health care 
contribution rate. Introduction of new 
regional tax ('IRAP') based on the value 
of production net of depreciations (1998). 
Reductions of employers' social 
contributions in respect of new jobs and 
also at the low end of the pay scale (1997-
2000).
LU • Across-the-board reduction in personal 
income tax rates (1998). Across-the-board 
reduction in personal income tax rates 
(2001-2002).
• Increase in the minimum level of taxable 
income (2001). 
• Increase in contribution for sickness 
insurance (2000). 15
Box 2  Continued 
NL • Across-the-board reduction in personal 
income tax (2001). 
• Introduction of a tax credit for all 
employees and self employed (2001-
2002), in return, lump sum deductions for 
labour cost expenses and self-employed 
were abolished in 2001 
• Contribution for disability insurance 
scheme shifted from the employee to the 
employer (1998). 
• Increases in employees' contribution rate 
for state pensions and medical expenses 
(1998-2000).
• Reductions of wage tax and employers' 
social contributions in respect of the 
long-term unemployed, the low-paid and 
also for training (1996-2001). 
• Reductions in employees' contribution 
rate for unemployment insurance (2001). 
PT • General reduction in personal income tax 
rates (2001). 
• Targeted reductions in employers' social 
contributions (2001). 
AT
3 • Increases in family allowances and 
children's tax credits (1998-2000). 
• Reduction of the tax schedule and 
increase in the general tax credit (2000). 
• Reduction of employers' contribution 
rates for health insurance and pay 
insurance schemes for 'blue collar' 
workers (2001). 
FI • Reductions in central- and local income 
tax, especially at the bottom- to the 
middle end (1995-2002). 
• Abolition of the lowest income tax 
bracket in 2001 (in other words, increase 
in the tax exemption) plus subsequent 
increase in the tax exemption in 2002. 
• Reductions in employees' and employers' 
contribution rates (1997-2002). 
SE • Reductions in central- and local income 
tax, especially at the bottom to the middle 
end (1999-2001). 
• Increase in threshold for State income tax 
(2000-2002) and increase in basic 
allowance (2001-2002) 
• Increases in employees' contribution rates 
(1995-1998).
• Reductions in employers' contribution 
rates (2000-2001). 
UK • Personal income tax reductions, 
especially at the bottom to the middle 
end (1999-2000). 
• Increase in starting point for paying 
national insurance contributions (NIC) 
for employers and employees. Reduction 
in employers' contribution rates to 
compensate for introduction of climate 
levy (1999-2001). 
• Increase of the NIC by 1% for both 
employers and employees (2002) 16
Box 2  Continued 
(1) In France, the effects of the recent reductions of personal income tax were apparently partially 
offset at the aggregate level as a result of higher revenues from the generalised social contribution 
(CSG) and the contribution for the reduction of the debt of social security institutions (CRDS) since 
late 1990s; those contributions are currently being gradually reduced (2001-2003). France also 
witnessed sharp increases in tax receipts in the financial year 1999, notably from direct taxes. 
(2) In Italy, the 1997-1998 tax reform eliminated employers' compulsory health care contributions, 
bringing the overall employer's social contribution rate down substantially. At the same time, 
however, a new tax for employers, called 'IRAP', based on the value of production net of 
depreciations was introduced. For reasons of comparability, a part of the revenue of this new tax has 
been allocated to labour income (and included in the denominator of the implicit tax rate) while it is 
not actually levied on wages and salaries as such. 
(3)In Austria, the effects of the recent reductions in personal income tax were apparently offset at the 
aggregate level as a result of sharp increases in direct tax revenues in 2001. These increases are 
related to base-broadening measures and significantly increasing tax pre-payments, in reaction to the 
introduction of interest charges on tax arrears from October 2001 onwards. Children tax credits do 
not effect implicit tax rate because they are not booked among taxes but among benefits. 
Source: Commission Services 17
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: THE ROLE OF IMPUTED SOCIAL CONTRIBUTION ON ITR ON 
LABOUR
Employers' imputed social contributions (D612) represent the counterpart to unfunded 
social benefits paid directly by employers to their employees. The fact that certain social 
benefits are paid directly by employers and not through the medium of social security 
funds, in no way detracts from their character as social welfare benefits. According to the 
guidelines of national accounts the value of imputed social contribution should be based 
on actuarial considerations. The remuneration should therefore be imputed for employees 
equal in value to the social contributions that would be needed to secure the de facto 
entitlements to the social benefits they accumulate
10.
In other words this is important for (mainly) governments which do not pay actual 
contributions for their employees but which directly provide to them a pension when they 
retire. In this case imputed social contributions represent the contribution the government 
should pay to a pension fund in order to provide a pension of an equivalent amount to the 
employees. 
Despite the fact that imputed social contributions are not considered part of total taxes in 
the framework of the publication "Structures of the taxation systems in the EU" where 
the  ITR on labour is presented, indeed their inclusion or exclusion in the definition of 
total taxes, and consequently among taxes on labour, is rather controversial. On one hand 
including imputed social contributions in the definition would correct the downward bias 
in the total taxes-to-GDP for Member States in which in the government does not make 
actual contributions for its employees. Another argument for including imputed social 
contributions is the greater comparability over time for countries whose governments 
stop paying actual social contributions to a social security fund and instead simply pay 
social benefits to their employees as their entitlement arises. By this change, the tax-to-
GDP ratio decreases if imputed social contributions are omitted. On the other hand 
imputed social contributions are not based on actual transactions and the method of 
imputation can involve estimation errors.  
If imputed social contributions were part of the taxes on labour, the ITR on labour would 
be shifted upwards in several Member States. It should be noted that imputed social 
contributions are presently part of the denominator of the ITR since they are part of total 
compensation of employees (D1). Among the arguments in favour of considering 
imputed social contributions among taxes on labour there is the fact that the ITR on 
labour is a macro indicator that takes account of all the sectors of the economy. Imputed 
social contributions represent part of (non wage) labour cost for some public institutions 
which do not make actual contributions, so omitting them would mean omitting part of 
non wage labour costs of the economy. 
It can be seen from the graphs that the impact of including imputed social contribution in 
the numerator of the ITR on labour would be quite substantial. The ITR for the EU-15 
average would be shifted upwards more than 1.5 percentage points with no impact on the 
annual trend. Regarding single Member States the highest changes would be found in 
10 European Commission (1996) 18
Greece (+6.7%), Belgium (+3.8%), France (+3.5%) and Austria (+3.3%), but all Member 
States would show a visible increase apart the Netherlands and Finland
11.
Graph 3 Sensitivity analysis for imputed social contributions for the EU-15 average 
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Graph 4 Sensitivity analysis for imputed social contributions per Member State 
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11 Imputed social contributions are not available for the UK.  19
6. A COMPARISON WITH TAX WEDGES COMPUTED FOR EXAMPLE HOUSEHOLD TYPES
Every year, the OECD releases Taxing Wages, a publication providing internationally 
comparable data of total tax wedges – between labour costs to the employer and the 
corresponding net take-home pay of the employee – for various example household 
types and different representative wage levels. It is assumed that the earned income 
derived from employment is equal to a given fraction of the average gross earnings of 
adult, full-time workers in the manufacturing sector. The tax wedges are calculated on 
the basis of the tax legislation, by expressing the sum of personal income tax, employee 
plus employer social contributions together with any payroll tax, as percentage of total 
labour costs. They have the theoretical possibility to disentangle discretionary tax 
policy measures as regards personal income tax and social contributions. However, 
because of the theoretical approach, this method does not relate to actual tax revenue, 
nor does it incorporate all the elements of the tax system that may be relevant, such as 
effects of special tax relief available on the tax base. 
Pair-wise comparisons between the macro - backward looking implicit - tax rates on 
labour and the - micro example - tax wedge for a single average production worker at 
average earnings (without children) indicate that the tax wedges are significantly higher 
than the implicit tax rates of labour for some countries (Graph 5). As a result, the ranking 
between the Member States may also be quite different. The differences are not specific 
to a single year. Nevertheless, the correlation between the macro and micro indicators is 
still moderately strong. Member States with a high tax wedge for an average production 
worker generally also have relatively high implicit tax rates on labour and the other way 
around. For example, Sweden and Belgium are consistently in the higher group regarding 
the taxation of labour, and Ireland and the United Kingdom are always in the lower range 
(Graph 5). 
A complete correlation cannot be expected, due to conceptual and statistical differences 
between the macro and the micro indicators. The gross wages and salaries from National 
Accounts which form the basis of the implicit tax rate on labour do not correspond to the 
particular wage level of an average full-time production worker in the manufacturing 
industry. The aggregate gross compensation of employees represents the sum of all gross 
wages paid in a given year, i.e. they include all workers, both full-time and part-time and 
across all economic sectors. Moreover, the denominator of the micro example tax wedge 
does in some cases not contain information of (employer provided) contributions to 
private pension and related schemes. Moreover, the macro implicit tax rate uses the 
actual tax revenues raised on total labour income in a certain year with accrual 
adjustments. The diversity of different household- and wage level situations will be 
reflected in these actual tax revenues. Another conceptual difference is that the tax wedge 
includes cash benefits (considered as a negative tax) while they are not considered by the 
ITR on labour. 
Some of the observed differences between the macro and micro indicators can probably 
be explained by the fact that employees at the lower end of the pay scale are generally 
subject to relatively lower taxation or even no taxation at all. Such employees with a 
relatively low tax burden apparently have substantial weight in the calculation of the 
implicit tax rate on labour. Another explanation for the lower level of the Implicit tax rate 
on labour with respect to the micro indicator is the fact that the former takes account of 
non-standard tax reliefs (e.g. medical expenses) which are not considered by the latter. 20
It should be also noted that if imputed social contributions were included in the definition 
of taxes on labour (see paragraph 5), ITR on labour would be closer to the tax wedge in 9 
countries out of 15 and in the EU-15 average. This is probably linked to the fact that 
omitting imputed contributions means omitting part of non-wage labour costs of some 
public institutions which do not make actual contributions. This could bias downwards 
the ITR on labour which is a macro indicator that should take account of all sectors of the 
economy. On the other hand the tax wedge is a micro indicator of a specific private 
sector, so it is not affected by imputed social contributions. 
Graph 5 Pair-wise comparisons between macro and micro indicators 
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 Source: Commission Services, using data from Taxing Wages (OECD 2004). 21
Graph 6 Relationship between macro and micro indicators 
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The following graph compares the time-trends between micro tax wedge indicators and 
two macro backward-looking tax ratios: the implicit tax rate on labour and the total tax-
to-GDP ratio. The tax-to-GDP ratio is calculated by expressing all taxes and social 
contributions as a share of GDP. For each year GDP-weighted averages are computed. 
Indices representing the trend of each variable have been plotted in Graph 7 (with 
1995=100). Over the period 1995-2002, the EU average tax burden on labour visibly 
starts to decline. This trend is evidenced by the development of both indicators. 
However, the reductions in the tax wedges for an average production worker are clearly 
more pronounced for most Member States, as the consequences of the recent tax reforms 
immediately show up in this indicator. The changes in the tax wedges appear to be 
particularly large in Ireland, Finland and Italy (see also 0). In year 2002 on the other 
hand, the ITR on labour decreased much more than the tax wedge, and this could be 
explained by two reasons. The first one is that the ITR usually follow with some delay 
the development of the tax wedge; this is due to the fact that ESA95 allows using a time-
shifted cash system of booking tax receipts, which means that revenues in a certain year 
could be still affected by some tax provision of the previous year. The second reason is 
that the ITR does not disentangle the business cycle, so the development in 2002 of the 
two indicators could suggest that the reductions in the ITR for 2002 are more linked to 
the economic slowdown of years 2001-2002 than to tax provisions. 22
Graph 7 Time trend micro and macro indicators in the Union 
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Source: Commission Services, using data from Taxing Wages (OECD 2004 and previous editions). 
The 2002-2003 edition of Taxing Wages (2004) presents highest reductions in the tax 
wedge for a single worker at average earnings between 2001 and 2002 for Luxemburg  
(-2.6), Denmark and Sweden (-0.9). 
Tax wedges for a single example worker at average earnings 
1995-2002, in % 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Diff. 95-02 Diff. 98-02
BE 56,3 56,4 56,6 56,8 56,9 56,2 55,6 55,1 -1,2 -1,7
DK 45,2 44,8 45,1 43,7 44,5 44,4 43,6 42,7 -2,5 -1,0
DE 50,2 51,2 52,3 52,2 51,9 51,8 50,8 51,1 0,9 -1,1
EL 35,6 35,8 35,8 36,1 35,7 36,0 35,7 34,6 -1,0 -1,5
ES 38,5 38,8 39,0 39,0 37,5 37,6 37,9 38,2 -0,3 -0,8
FR 49,1 49,7 48,7 47,6 48,1 48,2 48,3 48,2 -0,9 0,6
IE 36,9 36,1 33,9 33,0 32,4 28,9 25,8 24,5 -12,4 -8,5
IT 50,3 50,8 51,5 47,5 47,2 46,7 46,1 46,0 -4,3 -1,5
LU 34,3 34,5 35,2 33,8 34,6 35,5 33,9 31,3 -3,0 -2,5
NL 44,8 43,8 43,6 43,5 44,3 45,1 42,3 42,5 -2,3 -1,0
AT 41,2 44,8 45,6 45,8 45,9 44,9 44,5 44,7 3,5 -1,1
PT 33,7 33,8 33,9 33,8 33,4 33,5 32,5 32,6 -1,1 -1,2
FI 51,2 49,4 48,9 48,8 47,4 47,3 45,9 45,2 -6,0 -3,6
SE 49,3 50,2 50,7 50,7 50,5 49,5 48,5 47,6 -1,7 -3,1
UK 33,4 32,6 32,0 32,0 30,8 30,1 29,5 29,5 -3,9 -2,5
EU-15 46,1 46,4 46,1 45,1 44,6 44,1 43,4 43,3 -2,8 -1,8
Source: Commission Services, using data from Taxing Wages (OECD 2004 and previous editions). 23
Trends in average tax ratios can conceal some important variation in patterns of change 
across Member States. Graph 8 at the end of this paragraph therefore shows comparisons 
of trends in the tax ratios for all Member States. Comparisons for the implicit tax rate on 
labour are not only given with respect to the tax wedge indicator for a single average 
production worker, but also with respect to tax wedge indicators for a two-earner married 
couple without children. It appears that the general increasing or decreasing trends in the 
macro and micro indicators follow each other rather closely in most Member States. 
However, notable differences in the trends are visible for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
the United Kingdom. In principle, these differences could be explained by the conceptual 
differences between the two indicators and/or by strong economic growth
12. A 
decomposition of the change in the denominator of the implicit tax rate on labour 
actually suggests that the differences could perhaps partly be attributed to cyclical 
movements during the period 1995-2002. The figures in table 3 show that the average 
annual growth rate of the nominal compensation per employee during this period was 
clearly above the EU average in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The figures furthermore 
show that the average annual growth rate of the personal income tax revenue per 
employee was clearly above the EU average in Greece, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom
13. For reasons outlined above, the increases in the average growth rate of the 
compensation of employees (or the compensation of a group of employees) could have 
induced a swing in the implicit tax rate on labour in these Member States that, to some 
extent, has offset the effect of the recent tax policy measures (that are incorporated and 
more visible in the micro tax wedge indicators that are computed for specific wage levels 
and household types). 
12 Some notable differences are also visible for Italy. The 1997-98 tax reform in Italy eliminated employer’s 
compulsory health care contributions, bringing the overall employer’s social security contribution rate 
down substantially. At the same time, however, a new tax for employers, called ‘IRAP’, based on value 
added was introduced. For reasons of comparability, a part of the revenue of this new tax has in fact been 
allocated to labour income for the calculation of the implicit tax rate (and has also been included in the 
denominator of the implicit tax rate), while it is not actually levied on wages and salaries as such. It is not 
reflected in the micro tax wedge indicators. 
13 For the UK, the revenue effect of the targeted reductions in personal tax at the lower end seem at the 
aggregate level to have been offset by increases in personal income at the top of the income scale. Some 
noticeable differences between the two indicators are also visible for Spain in 2000 and 2001. This should 
be attributed to a substantial increase in wages and salaries subject to tax as a result of a strong job 
creation process observed in the Spanish economy in the last few years. 24
Table 2 Growth rates of nominal compensation per employee, number of employees  
  and personal income tax revenue per employee 







tax revenue per 
employee
1
BE 2,7 1,4 2,2
DK 3,8 1,0 2,1
DE 1,4 0,4 1,1
EL 7,6 1,4 9,2
ES 3,4 3,2 2,5
FR 2,4 1,7 10,2
IE 5,8 5,2 3,0
IT 2,8 1,6 5,5
LU 3,0 2,1 1,0
NL 3,7 2,6 0,8
AT 1,9 0,9 1,8
PT 5,6 1,8 4,6
FI 3,0 2,3 4,0
SE 4,4 1,0 2,2
UK 4,5 1,5 8,5
EU-15 3,0 1,5 4,2
1 Only income tax that is raised on (employed) labour income, excluding
Social contributions of any kind
Source:  Commission Services25
Graph 8 Time trend micro and macro indicators in the EU-15 Member States 
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions from the examinations undertaken in the Commission Services report 
should be that: 
• Observations at the micro-level for one particular wage level cannot simply be 
projected onto the implicit tax rate at macro-level, and conversely. This can be 
attributed the statistical and conceptual differences between the two types of 
indicators.
• Nevertheless, the correlation between the micro- and the macro indicators seems 
to be reasonably strong. Countries with a relatively high average tax wedge for 
production workers at average earnings should generally also have relatively high 
macro implicit tax rate of labour, and the other way around. 
• With a few exceptions, both types of tax indicators also have comparable 
informative content as regards to general increasing- or decreasing trends in the 
average tax burden on labour, although there can sometimes be sizeable 
differences in the level of the changes.
• It should be kept in mind that the changes in the macroeconomic implicit tax rate 
may reflect structural changes in the entire economy, such as changes in the 
distribution of wage income. The implicit tax rate relates to actual tax revenue 
data and it could be, for example, that the revenue effect of targeted reductions in 
personal income tax, at say, the lower end of the income scale, has been offset by 
increases in wage income at the top of the wage scale.
Generally, this means that micro and macro indicators should be used in a 
complementary way and evidence from the implicit tax rate needs to be corroborated by 
other information and preferably also other tax indicators before policy conclusions can 
reasonably be drawn. 28
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